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THE SHERMAN ACT AND THE VICIOUS




[A]s a vicious will without a vicious act is no civil crime, so, on the
other hand, an unwarrantable act without a vicious will is no crime
at all So that to constitute a crime against human laws, there must
be, first, a vicious will,- and secondl, an unlawful act consequent
upon such vicious will *
George E Garvey**
I. INTRODUCTION
The Sherman Act,' which addresses the problems of economic power
and its abuses,2 is unique in several significant respects. First, the Act's
proscriptions are unusually vague.3 Congress specifically intended that the
* 4 W. BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES 21 (referring to the mental element of a
crime as a "vicious will").
** Assistant Professor, The Catholic University of America School of Law. B.A., Uni-
versity of Illinois at Chicago Circle, 1969; J.D., University of Wisconsin, 1972.
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976). The Sherman Act's criminal provisions provide, in perti-
nent part:
Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or con-
spiracy . . . [in restraint of trade or commerce] shall be deemed guilty of a fel-
ony ....
Id § I.
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or con-
spire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be guilty of a
felony . ..
Id § 2.
2. For discussions of the conflicting goals of antitrust, see R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST
PARADOX (1978); W. SHEPHERD, THE TREATMENT OF MARKET POWER (1975); Joffe, Beyond
Antitrust, 28 CATH. U.L. REV. 1 (1978); Symposium on Antitrust Law and Economics, 127 U.
PA. L. REV. 918 (1979); Symposium - The Goals ofAntitrust: .4 Dialogue on Policy, 65
COLUM. L. REV. 363 (1965).
3. Although the Supreme Court has determined that the Sherman Act is not unconsti-
tutionally vague, see Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 376-78 (1913), its language does
not proscribe specific conduct. Unlike traditional criminal statutes, the Sherman Act de-
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substance of the Act be developed over time by the judiciary.4 Second, the
Act sets forth a multi-pronged enforcement procedure. Violations may
give rise to criminal prosecutions,5 to private civil actions for treble dam-
ages, 6 to private' and governmental actions in equity,a or to governmental
damage suits. 9
Pursuant to its legislative mandate, the courts have developed a "com-
mon law" of antitrust by constantly defining and refining the substance of
the Sherman Act.'° The substantive "refinement" producing the most dra-
matic reaction was the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Standard Oil
Co. v. United States" that only unreasonable restraints of trade violate
section 1 of the Act. The vagaries of this "rule of reason" have been par-
tially resolved through judicial creation of theper se rule. 2 But these two
rules have been in constant tension and the Supreme Court has never suc-
cessfully articulated the scope of either rule nor defined their relationship
to each other.' 3 Antitrust courts have experienced similar difficulties at-
tempting to establish a rational standard or standards to distinguish be-
tween legal "monopoly" and illegal "monopolization."' 4
scribes only the general harm to be prevented. See generally Kadish, Some Observations On
the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Economic Regulations, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 423,
427-28 (1963). The concept of criminal combination in restraint of trade was not well de-
fined when the Sherman Act was passed. See generally H. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTI-
TRUST POLICY: ORIGINATION OF AN AMERICAN TRADITION 50-53 (1955).
4. See notes 181-82 and accompanying text infra.
5. The Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, Pub. L. No. 93-528, § 3, 88 Stat. 1706
(1974) (amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (1970)), elevated criminal liability for Sherman Act vio-
lations to felonies and increased the maximum prison sentence to three years. The Act also
increased fines to a maximum of $1 million for corporations and $100,000 for individuals.
6. Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
7. Clayton Act § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1976).
8. Clayton Act § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1976).
9. Clayton Act § 4A, 15 U.S.C. § 15a (1976).
10. The source of the "common law" of antitrust, however, has been statutory. There
are no strictly common law crimes in the federal courts. See W. LA FAVE & A. SCOTT,
CRIMINAL LAW 60-61 (1972).
11. 221 U.S. i (1911). For the classical formulation of the "rule of reason," see Justice
Brandeis' opinion in Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238-39 (1918).
12. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., Inc., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); L.
SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 182-86 (1977).
13. See, e.g., National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679
(1978); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977); United States v.
Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 422 U.S. 86 (1975); White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S.
253 (1963).
14. Compare Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) and United States v.
United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920) with United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100
(1948) and United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). Uni-
form standards are also difficult to establish because of the changing depth of judicial popu-
lism and diverse economic views. For a current discussion of the competing schools of
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Despite active judicial development of substantive antitrust law, the
courts have historically failed to distinguish between those activities that
may result in civil liability and those that may lead to criminal convic-
tion.' 5 Until recently, a violation of the Sherman Act warranting the issu-
ance of an injunction or an award of civil damages was, without more, a
criminal violation. 16
In United States v. United States Gypsum Co. , ' however, the Supreme
Court acknowledged that, even in the context of the Sherman Act, the ap-
peal of a criminal conviction involves different considerations than an ap-
peal of a civil judgment. The Court implicitly recognized that the
substance of criminal antitrust violations must be developed under the
principles of criminal law rather than civil antitrust precedent alone.'"
The Court held, therefore, that intent is an essential element of a criminal
violation of the Sherman Act. 1'
The Gypsum decision, in a manner characteristic of the Burger Court's
approach to antitrust,' is explicitly narrow. It addressed the specific facts
before the Court with frequent disclaimers about legal implications be-
yond those facts.2 ' The principles articulated in Gypsum, however, should
impact on related, though factually different cases.
Since the Supreme Court decided Gypsum, several courts of appeals
antitrust economics, see Posner, The Chicago School ofAntitrustAnalysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV.
925, 944 (1979).
15. Prior to United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978), the
Supreme Court found the Sherman Act to have the "same substantive reach in criminal and
civil cases." Id at 474 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). This unitary
treatment probably resulted more from inattention than deliberation. See generally 13 J.
VON KALINOSKi, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION §§ 95A.01 to .02 (1979). Com-
pare United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948) (civil) with United States v. Patten, 226
U.S. 525 (1912) (criminal).
16. Even after the 1974 amendments making criminal violations felonies, the courts
rejected arguments that the government must prove "specific intent." See United States v.
Champion Int'l Corp., 557 F.2d 1270, 1274 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Noll Mfg. Co.,
1977-2 Trad. Cas. 61,712 (N.D. Cal.). But see United States v. Nu-Phonics, Inc., 433 F.
Supp. 1006, 1015 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (Sherman Act law of mens rea and overt acts should be
reconsidered because of new felony provisions).
17. 438 U.S. 422 (1978).
18. See id at 436-40.
19. Id at 435. In a separate opinion, Justice Stevens argued that the unitary treatment
of civil and criminal violations was so well established that it could only be changed by
congressional amendment. Id at 474 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Without the constraint of precedent, however, Justice Stevens would have adopted the more
demanding specific purpose standard. Id at 474-75.
20. See Posner, The Antitrust Decisions of the Burger Court, 47 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J.
819, 822 (1978).
21. See, e.g., 438 U.S. at 436 n.13, 444 n.21.
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have had an opportunity to apply its principles.22 Their decisions raise
significant issues about the standard adopted by the Gypsum Court. The
claims of the various defendants and the judicial reactions to those claims
have questioned the applicability of the single degree of culpability ac-
cepted by the Court in Gypsum - knowledge - without regard to the
nature of the offense. In particular, defendants convicted under the new
felony provisions have contended that a higher standard of culpability
should be required because of the increased penalties. 23 Most signifi-
cantly, however, subsequent decisions appear to be carving out an excep-
tion to the Gypsum rule that intent is an essential element of a criminal
Sherman Act conviction when per se violations are involved. Such an ex-
ception is inconsistent with Gypsum as well as with the criminal jurispru-
dential traditions that Gypsum reaffirmed.
This article will evaluate the intent issue in several steps. First, Gypsum
and its progeny will be examined to place the issue in context. Next, the
article will consider the status of and reasons for a requisite mental ele-
ment for criminal condemnation. Emphasis will be placed on the common
law development of strict criminal liability. The focus will then shift to the
evolution of strict liability in the Supreme Court. Against this back-
ground, the Sherman Act's criminal provisions will be analyzed to see if
they may be appropriately considered strict liability offenses under com-
mon law or federal judicial precedent. Finally, the factors used by the
appellate courts to distinguish their cases from Gypsum will be reviewed to
determine whether they justify a different result.
II. GYPSUM AND ITS PROGENY
A. United States v. United States Gypsum Co.
Gypsum was the first case in which the Supreme Court found that the
substance of a Sherman Act offense depends on the nature of the proceed-
ing as well as the defendant's activities.24 Because of the seminal nature of
22. See United States v. Continental Group, Inc., 603 F.2d 444 (3d Cir. 1979), petition
for cert. filed, 48 U.S.L.W. 3310 (U.S. Oct. 26, 1979) (No. 79-679); United States v. Gillen,
599 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3192 (Oct. 2, 1979); United States v.
Foley, 598 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir. 1979),petition for cert.filed, 47 U.S.L.W. 3776 (U.S. May 18,
1979) (No. 78-1737); United States v. Brighton Bldg. & Maintenance Co., 598 F.2d 1101 (7th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3191 (Oct. 2, 1979).
23. See note 5 supra.
24. In addition to the intent issue, the Gypsum decision addressed both the propriety of
ex parte communications between a court and jurors and the relationship between the
Robinson-Patman Act and the Sherman Act. See generally Handler, Antitrust - 1978, 78
COLUM L. REV. 1363, 1395-1411 (1978); The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, 92 HARV. L. REV.
5, 288 (1978). Professor Handler believes that Gypsum was a departure from United States
v. Patten, 226 U.S. 525 (1912). Handier, supra, at 1399.
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the opinion, its reasoning must be analyzed carefully to appreciate its im-
plications.
The defendants were manufacturers of gypsum board, a product used in
the construction of interior walls and ceilings. After a lengthy grand jury
investigation, the defendants were indicted for allegedly conspiring to fix
prices, terms and conditions of sales, and handling methods for gypsum
board in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.25 The government's
case was based primarily upon evidence of widespread price verification
between the defendants. The Supreme Court synopsized the prosecution
as follows:
The focus of the Government's price-fixing case at trial was inter-
seller price verification - that is, the practice allegedly followed
by the gypsum board manufacturers of telephoning a competing
producer to determine the price currently being offered on gyp-
sum board to a specific customer.26
In response, the defendants attempted to show that all price verification
contacts "were for the purposes of complying with the Robinson-Patman
Act and preventing customer fraud.",27 They argued that their motivation
brought their behavior within a "controlling circumstances" exception to
Sherman Act liability.28 If the issue of liability was put to the jury, the
defendants wanted the factual question about their purpose to be resolved.
Nevertheless, the trial court's jury instructions, as interpreted by the
Supreme Court, considered the defendants' purpose to be irrelevant if the
effect of the pricing communications was to fix prices:
[T]he law presumes that a person intends the necessary and natu-
ral consequences of his acts. Therefore, if the effect of the ex-
25. 438 U.S. at 427.
26. Id at 429. See generally Senner, Dissemination of Price Information, 46 A.B.A. AN-
TITRUST L.J. 664 (1977).
27. 438 U.S. at 429.
28. The "controlling circumstances" exception to § I liability for exchanging price in-
formation comes from a statement made by Justice Douglas in United States v. Container
Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333 (1969). In Container, the Court found that the exchange of
specific price information by competitors violates § 1. The defendants had claimed that
their practices were lawful under Cement Mfrs. Protective Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S.
588 (1925), but Justice Douglas explained that they were not protected by the "controlling
circumstance" of preventing customer fraud. 393 U.S. at 335. See generally Kefauver, The
Legality of Dissemination of Market Data by Trade Associations. What Does Container
Hold?, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 77 (1972); Note, Price Ver!fication Under Robinson-Patman."
The Creation of An Unnecessary "Controlling Circumstance," 58 B.U.L. REV. 127 (1978);
Note, Meeting Competition Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1476 (1977);
Note, Antitrust Liability for An Exchange of Price Information - What Happened to
Container Corporation?, 63 VA. L. REV. 639 (1977).
1980]
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change of pricing information was to raise, fix, maintain and
stabilize prices, then the parties to them are presumed, as a mat-
ter of law, to have intended that result.29
Upon this instruction, the jury found each defendant guilty.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed,
holding that the purpose for price verification activities could create a
"controlling circumstance" and provide an affirmative defense to a Sher-
man Act charge.3" The court did not distinguish between civil and crimi-
nal antitrust litigation. It relied solely on civil precedent in ruling that a
good faith attempt to avoid Robinson-Patman Act liability is a "control-
ling circumstance.'"3"
Although the Supreme Court affirmed, its decision was not based on the
purported conflict between the Robinson-Patman and Sherman Acts. The
Court found instead that the criminal nature of the proceedings added an
element to the offense that is not present in civil litigation:
[W]e hold that defendant's state of mind or intent is an element
of a criminal antitrust offense which must be established by evi-
dence and inference drawn therefrom and cannot be taken from
the trier of facts through reliance on a legal presumption of
wrongful intent from proof of an effect on prices.32
Consistent with its growing interest in substantive criminal law,3 3 the
Court showed a marked aversion to strict criminal liability. Relying pri-
marily on Morissette v. United States34 and the Model Penal Code, 35 it
determined that "intent generally remains an indispensible element of a
criminal offense"36 and that strict liability offenses enjoy a "generally dis-
29. 438 U.S. at 430 (quoting the district court's jury instructions).
30. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 550 F.2d 115, 123 (3d Cir. 1977). For
an analysis of the Third Circuit's opinion, see Kudon, United States Gypsum: Price Verxica-
tion: Controlling Circumstances or Controlling Prices, 23 VILL. L. REV. 688 (1978).
31. 550 F.2d at 123-26. See note 27 supra.
32. 438 U.S. at 435. The strength of the Court's rejection of presumed intent in criminal
cases was reaffirmed in Sandstrom v. Montana, 99 S. Ct. 2450 (1979). In Sandstrom, the
defendant was convicted of "deliberate homicide." He argued at trial that he did not pur-
posefully or knowingly kill the deceased, but the court instructed the jury that "the law
presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts." 1d at
2453. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the instruction could have led the jury to
believe there was either a legal presumption of intent or the evidentiary burden had shifted
to the defendant to prove a lack of intent. The Court explained that the state must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of every element of the offense. The Court stated
that relieving the state of its obligation violates the constitutional rights of a defendant. Id
at 2458.
33. See Saltzman, Strict Criminal Liability and the United States Constitution. Substan-
tive Criminal Law Due Process, 24 WAYNE L. REV. 1571 (1978).
34. 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
35. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
36. 438 U.S. at 437.
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favored status."37
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Burger enumerated several rea-
sons for the Court's refusal to apply strict liability to Sherman Act criminal
offenses. First, in contrast with traditional criminal statutes, "[t]he Sher-
man Act. . . does not, in clear and categorical terms, precisely identify the
conduct which it proscribes."3 Although Congress intended the federal
courts to give substance to the Act's prohibitions, judicial elaboration has
provided only "open-ended and fact-specific standards like the 'rule of
reason."' 39 Moreover, the courts have traditionally interpreted the Act
with a generality inappropriate for a criminal law.4°
The Court was also persuaded by the announced policy of the Antitrust
Division of the Department of Justice and of a special National Commit-
tee to Study the Antitrust Laws that criminal prosecution should be re-
served for those who intentionally or willfully violate the law.4' Finally,
the Court feared the possibility of "overdeterrence." If businessmen are
threatened with criminal conviction for seemingly legitimate conduct that
is found, regardless of intent, to have an undesirable effect on competition,
they may forego "salutary and procompetitive conduct."42
Having found intent an essential element of a criminal antitrust viola-
tion, the Court determined the nature of the requisite intent. Guided by
the Model Penal Code's classifications for culpability43 - purpose, knowl-
edge, recklessness, and negligence - the Court determined that knowl-
edge was sufficient for conviction: "[W]e conclude that action undertaken
with knowledge of its probable consequences and having the requisite an-
ticompetitive effects can be a sufficient predicate for a finding of criminal
37. Id at 438.
38. Id
39. Id
40. The Court explained that "the Act has not been interpreted as if it were primarily a
criminal statute; it has been construed to have a 'generality and adaptability comparable to
that found to be desirable in constitutional provisions."' Id at 439 (quoting Appalachian
Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1933)).
41. 438 U.S. at 439-40. The Court reaffirmed the holding in Nash v. United States, 229
U.S. 373 (1913), that the Sherman Act's broad sweep alone does not render its criminal
provisions unconstitutionally vague, but it implied that prosecutorial restraint by the De-
partment of Justice may have forestalled renewed constitutional challenges. 438 U.S. at 439.
The study referred to by the Court concluded that "criminal process should be used only
where the law is clear and the facts reveal a flagrant offense and plain intent unreasonably to
restrain trade." REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY
THE ANTITRUST LAWS 349 (1955), quoted in 438 U.S. at 439 (emphasis added).
42. 438 U.S. at 441. The Court also reasoned that strict criminal liability for antitrust
violations would not "punish conscious and calculated wrongdoing at odds with statutory
proscriptions, but instead. . . regulate business practices regardless of the intent with which
they were undertaken." Id at 442 (emphasis in original).
43. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
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liability under the antitrust laws."'
The scope of this holding was limited in three important respects. First,
the Court followed the Model Penal Code and explained that the issue of
culpability relates to each separate material element of the offense.45 Gyp-
sum determined that knowledge of anticompetitive effects is sufficient to
convict for the "restraint of trade" element, but it did not decide what
degree of culpability is necessary for finding agreement or conspiracy. It
was concerned solely with "the more traditional intent to effectuate the
objects of the conspiracy. '"46
Second, Gypsum's "knowledge" criterion concerns only completed con-
duct. Knowledge is an adequate predicate for criminal conviction under
section 1 only when anticompetitive effects are established. The Court
suggested that a "purpose" to achieve the illegal result must be shown in
order to convict when the proscribed result has not been realized.47
Finally, Gypsum does not eliminate the "controlling circumstances" de-
fense. Fear of incurring Robinson-Patman liability, however, is not a
"controlling circumstance" when the method used (price verification) will,
to the defendant's knowledge, stabilize prices. Although stating it as a
negative, the Court acknowledged the continued validity of the exception:
"A defendant's purpose in engaging in the proscribed conduct will not in-
sulate him from liability unless it is deemed of sufficient merit to justify a
general exception to the Sherman Act's proscriptions."48
The holding of Gypsum concerning intent may be summarized as fol-
lows: intent is an essential element of a criminal Sherman Act violation
and must be established by the government to obtain a conviction. If an-
ticompetitive effects are shown, the intent element necessary to establish a
restraint of trade is satisfied by proving that the defendants had knowledge
of the probable anticompetitive consequences of the challenged conduct.
Even if the requisite agreement, knowledge, and effect are established, a
defendant may affirmatively defend by proving the existence of "control-
ling circumstances."
B. Recent Applications of Gypsum
Since Gypsum, three courts of appeals have addressed the intent issue in
the context of criminal Sherman Act prosecutions. Two circuits have held
or implied that the Court's opinion in Gypsum does not require proof of
44. 438 U.S. at 444.
45. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(l)(4) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
46. 438 U.S. at 443 n.20.
47. Id. at 444 n.21.
48. Id at 448 n.23.
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intent when the purported violation isper se illegal under established case
law.
In United States v. Foley,49 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit upheld the convictions of several Maryland real estate
brokerage firms and their executives for conspiring to fix commission rates
on sales of residential property. The jury had been instructed that "de-
fendants must have known their agreement, if effectuated, would have an
effect on prices; that they knowingly joined a conspiracy whose purpose
was to fix prices; and that in joining they intended to further that pur-
pose."5° The defendants claimed they were entitled to an instruction re-
quiring the jury to find that they had "specifically intended" to restrain
trade. In their view, the necessary degree of culpability had to be greater
than that adopted in Gypsum because they were charged under the new
felony provisions. 5' The court held, however, that such specificity is not
required on either statutory or constitutional grounds, even with the more
serious penalties.52
In United States v. Brighton Building & Maintenance Co. ," the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reached a similar conclu-
sion. The defendants were convicted of rigging bids for highway construc-
tion projects in Illinois. As in Foley, the defendants claimed it was error
not to instruct the jury that a conviction could result only if the defendants
specifically intended to restrain trade.54 The court disagreed and found
sufficient an instruction that required a knowing agreement to rig bids and
intentional assistance in achieving that goal.55
The court bolstered its opinion by noting that bid rigging is a per se
violation of the Sherman Act, while the price verifications in Gypsum were
not. It did "not read Gypsum as indicating that once defendants are
49. 598 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir. 1979), petitionfor cert. fled, 47 U.S.L.W. 3776 (May 18,
1979) (No. 78-1737).
50. Id at 1336.
51. Id at 1335.
52. Id
53. 598 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 480 U.S.L.W. 3191 (Oct. 2, 1979).
54. The defendants' arguments in Brighton Building illustrate the inherent difficulties in
applying the concept of "specific intent." They contended that the jury must find that the
defendants had a specific intent to unreasonably restrain trade and that the defendants knew
their conduct violated the law. Lack of such knowledge, however, is similiar to the seldom
recognized defense of mistake of law. The Seventh Circuit, therefore, held it sufficient to
prove "that defendants knowingly agreed or formed a combination or conspiracy for the
purpose of rigging the bids, and intentionally assisted in its furtherance." Id at 1106.
In the context of Brighton Building, there were three possible variants of "specific intent":
(1) the intent to commit an act that violates the law (bid rigging); (2) the intent to achieve the
result proscribed by the statute (unreasonable restraint of trade); and (3) the intent to violate
the law (act purposely done with knowledge that it violated the Sherman Act).
55. Id
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proved to have intentionally made an agreement which is unlawfulper se,
there must be an instruction that the defendants cannot be convicted un-
less they are found to have intended to restrain trade or commerce. '"56
This dictum raises an issue distinct from that present in Gypsum. The
Court in Gypsum held that a presumption of intent could not be predicated
on an anticompetitive effect. There is, however, a subtle distinction be-
tween a presumption that the accused knew or intended the result and a
presumption that conduct identified as per se illegal is unreasonable. The
latter relates to the conduct itself; the former relates to the actor's state of
mind. These issues are not the same, and to the extent that Brighton Build-
ing infers that intent may be presumed because the activity isper se unrea-
sonable, it is inconsistent with Gypsum.
United States v. Gillen, " however, is the most disturbing of the post-
Gypsum decisions. In sustaining a conviction for price-fixing, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit concluded that the intent
element required in Gypsum applied only to borderline violations:58
The conduct at issue in Gypsum concededly was of such a nature
as to warrant a further inquiry into intent. The Supreme Court's
concern with those who unwittingly violate antitrust laws has no
place here . . . . The act of agreeing to fix prices is in itself ille-
gal; the criminal act is the agreement.59
Although the court postulated that proof of intent was not required in a
price-fixing case, it explained that if intent must be shown, it could be pre-
sumed from the agreement:
[T]he intent requirement[s] will always be met in a case involving
a price-fixing conspiracy. . . . Here, where [defendants'] actions
were nothing less than price-fixing, the violators cannot be heard
to argue that they did not know that their meetings and discus-
sions of price would result in an unreasonable restraint of trade.6°
The Third Circuit developed this limitation on the Gypsum knowledge
standard more fully in United States v. Continental Group, Inc. 61 After
reaffirming that knowledge of anticompetitive effects does not have to be
56. Id
57. 599 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3192 (Oct. 2, 1979). The
Third Circuit reaffirmed its limited view of Gypsum in United States v. Continental Group,
Inc., 603 F.2d 444 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3447 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1980) (No. 79-
679).
58. 599 F.2d at 544. Judge Adams, in a concurring opinion, argued that the majority's
treatment of the intent issue was inconsistent with Gypsum. Id at 548 (Adams, J., concur-
ring).
59. Id at 545.
60. Id
61. 603 F.2d 444 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3447 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1980) (No.
79-679).
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proven in per se cases, the court held that knowingly entering into an
agreement to engage in conduct that is per se illegal is sufficient to support
a criminal conviction.62 The Gypsum Court, however, did not address the
standard of intent required to satisfy the combination element of a Sher-
man Act violation. Its decision concerned only the intent to achieve the
proscribed restraint of trade.63
The post-Gypsum opinions raise several common issues. For example,
the defendants reintroduced the nebulous principle of "specific intent."
This concept was avoided in Gypsum because the Court adopted the more
comprehensible definitions in the Model Penal Code.64 Regardless of the
appropriate standard of culpability, the law would be less perplexing if
courts consistently applied the Code's terminology. Concepts such as
"criminal intent," "specific intent," "mens rea," or "scienter" may be sig-
nificant on a philosophical level because they all indicate that an evil state
of mind is an essential aspect of criminality. Applying such general no-
tions to fact-specific cases, however, often tends to confuse rather than
clarify the inquiry into intent because "[t]he mens rea differs from crime to
crime.""
Another issue in the post-Gypsum cases was whether conviction under
the 1974 felony statute required a heightened degree of intent or culpabil-
ity because of the greater potential penalty and stigma.66 Gypsum involved
misdemeanor convictions, and the defendants argued that something more
than "knowledge" should be required under the new law. This argument
has sound support in criminal jurisprudence but was summarily rejected
by each court.
Finally, and most importantly, Gillen, Brighton Building, and Continen-
tal Group intimated that even proof of knowledge was not required if the
alleged conduct is per se illegal under the Sherman Act.6 7 The requisite
intent may be presumed to exist when the defendant's conduct amounted
62. Id at 461-66.
63. 438 U.S. at 435, quoted in text accompanying note 32 supra.
64. The Model Penal Code adopted its measures of "culpability" largely to avoid the
confusing common law concepts of "general intent" and "specific intent." See MODEL PE-
NAL CODE § 2.02, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955); § 5.01(l)(b), Comment (Tent. Draft
No. 10, 1960).
65. R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 739 (3d ed. 1969).
66. See note 5 supra. The defendants in Foley and Brighton Building were convicted
for acts that occurred after the new felony provisions became effective. Gillen, however,
involved misdemeanor convictions. Nevertheless, in Continental Group, the court concluded
that the increased penalties did not alter the result in Gillen. 603 F.2d at 461.
67. See United States v. Gillen, 599 F.2d 541, 545 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 48
U.S.L.W. 3192 (Oct. 2, 1979); United States v. Brighton Bldg. & Maintenance Co., 598 F.2d
1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3191 (Oct. 2, 1979); note 61 and accom-
panying text supra.
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to a per se violation. The Third Circuit in particular appears to opt for
strict criminal liability. Its opinions suggest two reasons supporting this
variance from the holding in Gypsum. First, since the law regarding per se
offenses is well established, the defendants were not acting in the unclear
realm of the rule of reason.68 Second, per se offenses involve egregious
behavior.69 The first justification is suspect because it overstates the clarity
of per se rules.7" The latter reason - that the seriousness of the offense
justifies a lowered standard of culpability - is contrary to basic principles
of criminal law.7
III. THE ROLE OF INTENT IN CRIMINAL LAW
A. The General Rule
The generally accepted rule for the mental element of criminality is
readily stated: "[A] crime is committed only if the evil doer harbored an
evil mind."72 Nevertheless, the devotion to mens rea is not as timeless as is
usually suggested. The ancient common law required men to answer for
obvious trespasses without regard to intent.73 As the law developed, how-
ever, exceptions to this harsh rule began to multiply.74 In the case of a
requisite mental element for criminal liability, the exception eventually de-
voured the rule. When the Sherman Act was passed, therefore, courts gen-
erally required proof of a mental element to sustain criminal convictions.
Professor Sayre has explained the underlying rationale for the mens rea
requirement as follows:
In general, the mens rea is as vitally necessary for true crime as
understanding is necessary for goodness. To inflict substantial
punishment on one who is morally entirely innocent, who caused
injury through reasonable mistake or pure accident, would so
outrage the feelings of the community as to nullify its own en-
forcement.75
68. United States v. Gillen, 599 F.2d at 549.
69. Id
70. See notes 192-200 and accompanying text infra.
71. See notes 72-102 and accompanying text infra.
72. C. TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW § 27 (14th ed. 1978). Dean Roscoe Pound
believed that a criminal enactment not requiring some form of mens rea was "counter to the
very common-law conception of a crime." Pound, The Law of the Land, 62 AM. L. REV. 174,
182 (1928).
73. See R. PERKINS, supra note 65, at 739.
74. Id at 740-41.
75. Sayre, Public We/fare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 56 (1933). Another com-
mentator has stated:
Without moral culpability there is in a democratic community an explicable and
justifiable reluctance to affix the stigma of blame. This perhaps is the basic expla-
nation, rather than the selfish mediation of business interests, for the reluctance of
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B. Strict Criminal Liability
Although insistence on mens rea is the general rule, there is a contrary
tradition in criminal law: strict liability. In order to evaluate the decisions
limiting Gypsum, it is necessary to examine this doctrine's development,
ascertain it scope, and delineate the factors justifying its application. The
underlying question is whether it is justifiable to apply strict liability to
Sherman Act prosecutions.
In the mid-nineteenth century, legal devotion to the scienter require-
ment waned.7 6 Courts began to recognize the validity of criminal offenses
that required no proof of mental culpability. This development was part
of the criminal law's continuing response to society's changing estimation
of the individual and his or her responsibility to public well-being. In the
early nineteenth century, the individual was preeminent, but that
supremacy began to fade as the century progressed. One commentator ex-
plained: "[A]s a direct result of [a] new emphasis on public and social, as
contrasted with individual interest, courts have naturally tended to concen-
trate more upon the injurious conduct of the defendant than upon the
problem of his individual guilt."77 This shift in emphasis was the result of
a recognition that a technological, interdependent society needs to protect
itself against conduct injurious to the common welfare.78
Since strict liability runs counter to a fundamental concept of the com-
mon law, courts and scholars have attempted to discover some rational
basis for distinguishing between those offenses requiring intent and those
that do not. Early courts found that mens rea was required for offenses
that are mala in se, although not essential for those acts that are mala
prohibita.79 It has also been suggested that common law crimes always
require mens rea but statutory crimes do not if the appropriate legislative
administrators and prosecutors to invoke the criminal sanction; the reluctance of
jurors to find guilt and the reluctance of judges to impose strong penalties.
Kadish, supra note 3, at 437 (footnotes omitted).
76. Sayre attributes the conscious beginning of strict criminal liability to Regina v. Ste-
phens, [18661 1 Q.B. 702. Sayre, supra note 75, at 59. Stephens had been indicted because
his employee dumped slate into a navigable river. The court emphasized that if abatement
of a public nuisance was left to the public, no individual would have standing to sue. Judge
Mellor explained: "Inasmuch as the object of the indictment is not to punish the defendant,
but really to prevent the nuisance from being continued, I think that the evidence which
would support a civil action would be sufficient to support an indictment." I Q.B. at 710
(Mellor, J.). For examples of earlier strict liability decisions, see Sayre, supra note 75, at 56-
58; 1 J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 327-28 (2d ed. 1960).
77. Sayre, supra note 75, at 68. See generally Remington & Helstad, The Mental Ele-
ment in Crime- 4 Legislative Problem, 1952 Wis. L. REv. 644, 670.
78. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 256 (1952); Remington & Helstad,
supra note 77, at 670; Sayre, supra note 75, at 68. See also M.C. BASSIOUNI, SUBSTANTIVE
CRIMINAL LAW 186-88 (1978).
79. See J. HALL, supra note 76, at 337-42; Sayre, supra note 75, at 70.
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intent can be shown. 80 Sayre, on the other hand, considers strict liability
to be traditionally reserved for "public welfare offenses." 81
While each formulation is partially accurate, none embraces the com-
plete spectrum of strict liability offenses. More significantly, none justifies
departing from a fundamental rule of substantive criminal law. The appli-
cations of strict liability, therefore, must be further examined in an effort to
locate common, unifying factors.
Professor Packer has identified four categories of strict liability of-
fenses.82 The first and most difficult to rationalize includes "basic of-
fenses" for which proof of moral culpability has been eliminated for at
least one material element of the offense. These crimes include statutory
rape, felony-murder, misdemeanor-manslaughter, bigamy, and adultery.83
For example, in the case of statutory rape, the reason generally proferred
for ignoring an individual's good faith belief about the victim's age is that,
even if the victim was of age, it would not make the conduct legal; the
crime would then be adultery or fornication. Likewise, in felony-murder
and misdemeanor-manslaughter cases, some mens rea is present: the in-
tent to commit the felony or misdemeanor. A common element, therefore,
is the presence of some form of mens rea for some element of the offense.
84
Packer's second category of strict liability offenses also departs from the
common law mens rea requirement by using a negligence criteria.85 Al-
though the Model Penal Code includes it as a valid form of criminal culpa-
bility,86 negligence is disfavored and will not be deemed sufficient when a
statute is silent about the required degree of culpability.87 In any case, the
application of a negligence standard is not pertinent to a discussion relat-
ing to Sherman Act liability, because the Supreme Court in Gypsum
adopted knowledge as the appropriate standard. Moreover, those courts
finding an exception in the case of per se offenses suggest that mental cul-
pability in any form is not an element of the offense.
80. See Sayre, supra note 75, at 70.
81. Id. at 56. Most public welfare offenses involve: alleged sales of intoxicating liquor;
sales of impure or adulterated food or drugs; sales of misbranded articles; violations of an-
tinarcotic acts; criminal nuisances; violations of traffic regulations; violations of motor vehi-
cle laws; or violations of general police regulations passed for the safety, health, or well-
being of the community. Remington & Helstad, supra note 77, at 670.
82. Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 Sup. CT. REV. 107, 140.
83. Id at 141-42.
84. Id The imposition of strict liability for bigamy and adultery is harder to rational-
ize. The English courts have abandoned this approach and now require proof of mens rea.
See Sayre, supra note 75, at 75.
85. Packer, supra note 82, at 143-45. See generally M.C. BASSIOUNI, supra note 78, at
182-83.
86. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(d) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
87. Id § 2.02(3).
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The third category specified by Packer concerns judicial rejection of the
ignorantia legis defense.88 Except in very limited circumstances, the courts
have refused to recognize "mistake of law" as a legitimate defense to crim-
inal liability.8" Some defendants in post-Gypsum cases have implicitly
raised this defense. In Brighton Building, for example, the court rejected
summarily the claim that the defendants could be convicted only if they
actually knew their conduct violated the Sherman Act.9" The court's view
was consistent with the traditional lack of judicial sympathy for the mis-
take of law defense, and there is no reason to believe that the defense will
be treated differently in the context of the Sherman Act.
Most strict liability offenses fall within Packer's fourth category: public
welfare offenses. A classic application of strict liability under this category
involves the regulation of food and drug manufacturing and distribution.91
Such laws generally represent part of a much larger governmental regula-
tory scheme and are intended not so much to punish as to induce accepta-
ble behavior.92 Strict liability offenses of this type share several common
characteristics: (a) their goals are regulatory, not punitive;93 (b) the punish-
ment is not severe;94 and (c) there is no moral stigma attached to convic-
tion.95
Although strict liability is now well established, it is not generally well
received.96 The Model Penal Code, for example, completely rejects strict
liability when the offense is punishable by imprisonment.97 There is also
factual evidence that criminal liability without a guilty mind is so alien to
a public sense of morality that those responsible for enforcing such laws
88. Packer, supra note 82, at 145-46.
89. See J. HALL, supra note 76, at 343-76. Compare United States v. International Min-
erals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558 (1971) with Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957).
See general,y M.C. BASSIOUNI, supra note 78, at 449-52. The Model Penal Code provides a
limited defense based on ignorance or mistake. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04 (Proposed Offi-
cial Draft 1962).
90. See notes 53-71 and accompanying text supra.
91. See note 81 supra.
92. See Kadish, supra note 3, at 425-26. See also Paulus, Strict Liability.- Its Place In
Public Welfare Offenses, 20 CRIM. L.Q. 445 (1978).
93. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 258-59 (1952); Sayre, supra note 75,
at 72.
94. One commentator has stated: "If [the penalty] be serious, particularly if the offense
be punishable by imprisonment, the individual interest of the defendant weighs too heavily
to allow conviction without proof of a guilty mind." Sayre, supra note 75, at 72.
95. Kadish, supra note 3, at 425-26. But see text accompanying notes 83-84 supra.
96. For example, the Canadian Law Reform Commission concluded: "We arrive then,
it is submitted, at an impasse. On grounds'of morality and justice strict liability is intolera-
ble. On grounds of practicality it is essential." LAW REFORM COMM'N OF CANADA, STUD-
IES IN STRICT LIABILITY (1974), quoted in Paulus, supra note 92, at 445. The Commission
suggested a balance that prohibited imprisonment for strict liability offenses. Id at 447.
97. In limiting the use of strict liability under the Model Penal Code, the drafters stated:
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will do so only when personally convinced that the accused intended the
result. For example, Professor Carson studied the reports of the inspectors
charged with enforcing the British Factories Act of 1961,98 which relates to
factory safety conditions. The law does not require any form of intent for
criminal conviction. Based upon his extensive review of the reports, Car-
son concluded that enforcement officials had built into their program an
informal mental culpability requirement.99
The aversion to strict liability, however, is not universal. Some com-
mentators view the law as a utilitarian, rather than a moral instrument:
"[T]here is no necessary connection between the label 'crime' and public
morality . . . . Criminal law, particularly as it relates to economic crime,
is a set of techniques to be manipulated for social ends."' 00 It is questiona-
ble whether criminal law can or should be divorced from public morality,
but assuming that a utilitarian rationale does represent a legitimate view of
criminal law, it does not support the application of strict liability to the
Sherman Act. The legitimacy of a strict liability offense when judged by
this pragmatic standard depends solely on the law's efficacy. Those who
advocate this approach agree that any law that is to be employed as a
technique for modifying social behavior should be clear, unambiguous,
and strictly enforced.' 0 ' The Sherman Act fails on all three counts.'
C Constitutional Considerations
Since the mens rea requirement for criminality is premised on concepts
This section makes a frontal attack on absolute or strict liability in penal law,
whenever the offense carries a possibility of sentence of imprisonment....
This position is affirmed not only with respect to offenses defined by the Penal
Code; it is superimposed on the entire corpus of the law, so far as penal sanctions
are involved .... The liabilities involved are indefensible in principle, unless re-
duced to terms that insulate conviction from the type of moral condemnation that
is and ought to be implicit when a sentence of imprisonment may be imposed. In
the absence of minimal culpability, the law has neither a deterrent nor corrective
nor an incapacitative function to perform....
Crime does and should mean condemnation and no court should have to pass
that judgment unless it can declare that the defendant's act was wrong. That is too
fundamental to be compromised.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.05, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
98. Carson, Some SociologicalAspects of Strict Liability and the Enforcement of Factory
Legislation, 33 Moo. L. REV. 396 (1970).
99. Id at 403-04, 410-12. Paulus reached a similar conclusion after studying the British
food and drug laws. Paulus, supra note 92, at 457-60. See also note 75 supra.
100. Ball & Friedman, The Use of Criminal Sanctions in the Enforcement of Economic
Legislation: A Sociological View, 17 STAN. L. REV. 197, 211 (1965).
101. See id at 220.
102. See note 3 supra.
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of fundamental fairness, its abrogation raises constitutional questions. °3
The Supreme Court, however, has at times casually rejected the notion
that the Constitution imposes limitations on strict criminal liability."°4
The Supreme Court's earliest pronouncements about mens rea as a con-
stitutional requirement were unfortunate in result and the products of
unusual proceedings.'0 5 In Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota,0 6 the ap-
pellant was found by the trial court to have committed a civil trespass.
Challenging the validity of the statute on appeal, Shevlin-Carpenter ar-
gued that because the law contained a criminal provision not requiring
intent, both the civil and criminal aspects were unconstitutional. 0 7 The
Court saw no problem with the statute and ruled that its criminal provision
was severable.' 08 In so holding, the Court disposed of the only claim prop-
erly before it. Unfortunately, it went on to assert in broad language that
criminal sanctions could be imposed on persons unaware that their con-
duct was unlawful. 10 9
Twelve years after Shev/in-Carpenter, the Court unambiguously rejected
scienter as a constitutional requirement in criminal proceedings. In United
States v. Balint, "0 the Court was confronted with the validity of an indict-
ment charging a violation of section 2 of the Narcotics Act. " ' This statute
made it illegal to sell narcotics without using a form provided by the Inter-
nal Revenue Service. The district court had dismissed the indictment be-
cause it failed to allege that the defendant knew the substance was a
narcotic." 2 The defendant did not participate in the appeal, and the case
was decided on the exparte arguments of the government's counsel." 3
In reversing the district court's dismissal, the Court disposed of the argu-
ment that scienter was constitutionally required with a reference to Shev-
103. See generally Hippard, The Unconstitutionality of Criminal Liability Without Fault.
An Argumentfor a Constitutional Doctrine of Mens Rea, 10 Hous. L. REV. 1039 (1973).
104. Justice Rehnquist, in his separate opinion in Gypsum, was concerned that the major-
ity may have implied a "special constitutional difficulty if criminal liability is imposed with-
out fault." 438 U.S. at 473 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
105. See Packer, supra note 82, at 110-16.
106. 218 U.S. 57 (1910).
107. Id at 65-67.
108. Id at 66-67.
109. See id at 68-70. The Court stated that "public policy may require that in the prohi-
bition or punishment of particular acts it may be provided that he who shall do them shall
do them at his peril and will not be heard to plead in defense good faith or ignorance." Id
at 70.
110. 258 U.S. 250 (1922).
111. Ch. 223, 38 Stat. 785 (1914) (repealed 1939).
112. 258 U.S. at 251.
113. Packer has contended the government deliberately worded the indictment to bring
the strict liability issue before the Supreme Court. Packer, supra note 82, at 113.
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An-Carpenter" 14 and went on to state:
Many instances of [strict liability] are to be found in regulatory
measures in the exercise of what is called the police power where
the emphasis of the statute is evidently on the achievement of
some social betterment rather than the punishment of the crimes
as in the cases of mala in se. 115
The Court viewed the law primarily as a taxing provision "with the inci-
dental purpose of minimizing the spread of addiction to the use of poison-
ous and demoralizing drugs,""' 6 and it considered the sole issue to be
whether the legislature had intended scienter as an element of the of-
fense. 17 The Court did not mention that conviction could result in a five-
year prison sentence.
Balint represented a watershed in the development of strict criminal lia-
bility. It expressly established that there is no constitutional barrier to
strict criminal liability; therefore, legislative intent is controlling." 8 Balint
also implicitly found the gravity of the offense and the penalty to be irrele-
vant. The Court's failure to address the penalty issue has been severely
criticized. I I9
The next significant case raising the intent issue was United States v.
Dotterweich.2 ° It involved the application of strict liability under a stat-
ute prohibiting the shipment of misbranded or adulterated products in vio-
lation of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.' 2 ' In this context, the
use of strict liability was not surprising. The Court, again emphasizing the
regulatory nature of the statute, summarily dismissed the argument that
mens rea was required.' 22
114. 258 U.S. at 252.
115. Id. See also United States v. Behrman, 258 U.S. 280 (1922). In Berhman, decided
the same day as Balint, the Court found it irrelevant that a doctor believed he was following
professional medical standards in dispensing certain drugs. Id at 288.
116. 258 U.S. at 253.
117. Id at 253-54.
118. See Saltzman, supra note 33, at 1595. The Court inferred from the statute's silence
a congressional purpose to exclude mens rea as an element of the offense. See 258 U.S. at
254.
119. See, e.g., Packer, supra note 82, at 113, 146-50; Saltzman, supra note 33, at 1595;
Sayre, supra note 75, at 8 1. Perkins has suggested that the Court could have advanced strict
liability law by addressing the penalty issue: "Had the Court added that the penalty must be
limited to a fine if the sale resulted from an innocent and nonnegligent mistake of fact, we
would be many years ahead in the development of this part of the law." R. PERKINS, supra
note 65, at 796.
120. 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
121. Ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (current version at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1976)).
122. The Court explained:
The prosecution to which Dotterweich was subjected is based on a now familiar
type of legislation whereby penalties serve as effective means of regulation. Such
legislation dispenses with the conventional requirement for criminal conduct -
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These early cases were marked by a lack of concern for the principles
underlying the common law's requirement that mental culpability must
exist before an individual may be branded a criminal. Gradually, how-
ever, the Court began to appreciate, and consequently limit, the scope of
these sweeping opinions.
The Court's changing attitude regarding intent first surfaced in Dennis v.
United States. 23 In Dennis, the Court determined that a provision of the
Smith Act, 124 although not specifically incorporating a mental element,
must be construed to require some form of intent. It explained that "The
existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the
principles of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence."' 2 5 Dennis stands
in marked contrast to Balint, in which the Court was willing to infer from
the legislation's silence a congressional desire to exclude intent.
A year after Dennis, the Court confronted the question squarely and
acknowledged for the first time the gravity of the strict liability issue. In
Morissette v. United States, 26 the appellant had been convicted of stealing
or knowingly converting government property. Morissette had removed
spent bomb casings from a government practice range where they had
been thrown in piles and were rusting. Although Morissette testified at
trial that he reasonably believed that the casings were abandoned, the trial
court held such belief to be irrelevant. 2 7 In its view, the law was violated
by knowingly taking government property without permission. The court
of appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that intent was not an element
of the offense.'
28
Justice Jackson, writing for the majority, discussed in some detail the
development of strict liability, the types of cases to which it generally ap-
plied, and "the [aroused] concern of responsible and disinterested students
of penology"'129 about its growth. In reversing the conviction, he stated:
The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when
inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient notion. It is as
universal and persistent in mature systems of law as belief in
freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of
awareness of some wrongdoing. In the interest of the larger good it puts the bur-
den of acting at hazard upon a person otherwise innocent but standing in a respon-
sible relation to a public danger.
320 U.S. at 280-81. The Court was unnecessarily expansive because the real issue in Dot-
terweich was one of vicarious rather than strict liability. See Packer, supra note 82, at 118.
123. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
124. 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1976).
125. 341 U.S. at 500.
126. 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
127. Id at 249.
128. 1d at 249-50.
129. Id at 254 n.14.
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the normal individual to choose between good and evil.'3°
The Morissette decision, however, was not premised on constitutional con-
siderations. The issue was treated as one of statutory interpretation. The
Court refused to infer congressional intent to establish a strict liability
crime from the statute's silence, particularly because of the infamy at-
tached to a felony conviction and because stealing is a common law offense
with severe penalties.
3 1
While the Court has consistently refused to find a general constitutional
prohibition against criminal conviction without mens rea, it has found this
element constitutionally required in some circumstances. For example, the
Court has refused to permit the application of strict liability to crimes im-
pinging upon freedom of expression. 132 The emphasis, however, has been
on the first amendment and the possible "chilling" effect of the challenged
statutes.
The mens rea requirement has also been imposed to save otherwise un-
constitutionally vague criminal laws. 133 By interpreting a vague statute to
require some form of intent, the Court supplies the missing "notice" that
must be present to support a criminal prosecution. A person acting with
the requisite intent cannot be heard to claim lack of notice of the offense.
Although the Court has required proof of intent to save a vague statute,
it will not do so if the nature of the matter regulated should put reasonable
persons on notice of the legal strictures. In United States v. Freed,131 for
example, a statute forbidding the possession of hand grenades was upheld.
Likewise, in United States v. International Minerals & Chemicals Corp. ,
the Court noted that a person dealing in dangerous acids "must be pre-
sumed to be aware of the regulation."'
' 36
There are, therefore, two distinct lines of cases concerning the constitu-
tionality of criminal offenses not requiring scienter. The first, exemplified
130. Id at 250. Justice Jackson also stated:
A relation between some mental element and punishment for a harmful act is al-
most as instinctive as the child's familiar exculpatory "But I didn't mean to," and
has afforded the rational basis for a tardy and unfinished substitution of deterrence
and reformation in place of retaliation and vengeance as the motivation for public
prosecution.
Id at 250-51.
131. Id at 260-62.
132. See, e.g., Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S.
507 (1948).
133. See, e.g., Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957); Screws v. United States, 325
U.S. 91 (1945). See generally Colautti v. Franklin, 99 S. Ct. 675, 685-86 (1979); Kadish,
supra note 3, at 428; Packer, supra note 82, at 125.
134. 401 U.S. 601 (1971).
135. 402 U.S. 558 (1971).
136. Id at 564-65.
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by Balint, does not see any constitutional issue at all. The second, repre-
sented by Morissette, perceives a fundamental issue concerning the fair-
ness and morality of strict liability. The Supreme Court, however, has not
yet found criminal liability without any required mental element to be, by
itself, unconstitutional.'37 It has imposed constitutional limitations only
when freedom of expression is at stake or when a statute fails to give ade-
quate notice of its proscriptions. According to Packer, the Court has found
mens rea to be "an important requirement, but it is not a Constitutional
requirement, except sometimes." '138
IV. APPLICATION TO THE SHERMAN ACT
As we have seen, Gypsum held that the framers of the Sherman Act did
not intend to create a strict liability criminal offense.' 39 The Court relied
on the disfavored status of strict criminal liability, the indefiniteness of the
Sherman Act, and the differences between the Act and traditional criminal
offenses requiring no proof of mental culpability. Since lower courts have
suggested limitations on the scope of Gypsum, the factors relied upon by
the Supreme Court should be scrutinized in greater depth to determine
whether they are actually less compelling than the Court found them at the
time of its decision.
In construing the Sherman Act, the controlling factor is, of course, legis-
lative intent. Inquiry into the intent of Congress regarding the mental ele-
ment of any criminal statute should follow the rule established in
Morissette that strict liability is not favored, particularly when the offense
existed at common law.' 40 There is "an interpretive presumption that mens
rea is required"; 14 1 therefore, a congressional desire to create a criminal
offense dispensing with mens rea should not be inferred from legislative
silence. Two areas of inquiry can be pursued further than the Court did in
Gypsum to determine congressional motivations. First, and most signifi-
cant, is legislative history. Second, the Act can be more closely scrutinized
137. Saltzman has argued that analogous constitutional criminal law developments re-
quire a bar to strict liability. Saltzman, supra note 33, at 1574.
138. Packer, supra note 82, at 107.
139. See notes 32-42 and accompanying text supra.
140. See 342 U.S. at 263; text accompanying notes 34-37 supra. Certain restraints of
trade and monopolistic practices were indictable at common law. Many of the legislators
who enacted the Sherman Act believed they were providing federal enforcement of the com-
mon law prohibitions. Dewey, The Common-Law Background ofAntftrust Policy, 41 VA. L.
REV. 759 (1955). See also M. HANDLER, H. BLAKE, R. PITOFSKY & H. GOLDSCHMID, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON TRADE REGULATION 35-91 (1975); Letwin, The English Common Law
Concerning Monopolies, 21 U. CHI. L. REV. 355 (1954).
141. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 437 (1978).
1980]
Catholic University Law Review
to see if it has any of the traditional characteristics of a strict liability stat-
ute.
A construction of the Sherman Act should also attempt to maintain its
constitutionality. The Gypsum Court indicated that an intent requirement
minimizes the unfairness of convicting the unwary for violating a vague
statute.'4 2 An examination of the Court's treatment of analogous trade
regulations will reveal how close the Sherman Act's vagueness is to consti-
tutional impropriety in its criminal applications. If permitted by the legis-
lative history, strict adherence to an intent requirement will lessen the
Act's uncertainty and reinforce its constitutionality.
A. Legislative History
The legislative history of the Sherman Act is sparse. Nevertheless, it
does contain sufficient evidence to show that Congress did not intend to
create a criminal provision with less than the full panoply of rights attach-
ing to criminal prosecution. Much of the congressional debate about the
constitutionality and efficacy of the Act concerned the effect that the crimi-
nal provision would have on its interpretation and enforcement.
The antitrust bill that the Fifty-first Congress began to consider con-
tained three sections.'43 The first section declared certain anticompetitive
142. Id
143. As introduced, the bill provided:
[SEC. i.] That all arrangements, contracts, agreements, trusts, or combinations
between persons or corporations made with a view, or which tend, to prevent full
and free competition in the importation, transportation, or sale of articles imported
into the United States, or in the production, manufacture, or sale of articles of
domestic growth or production, or domestic raw material that competes with any
similar article upon which a duty is levied by the United States, or which shall be
transported from one State or Territory to another, and all arrangements, con-
tracts, agreements, trusts, or combinations between persons or corporations
designed, or which tend, to advance the cost to the consumer of any such articles,
are hereby declared to be against public policy, unlawful, and void.
SEC. 2. That any person or corporation injured or damnified by such arrange-
ment, contract, agreement, trust, or combination may sue for and recover, in any
court of the United States of competent jurisdiction of any person or corporation a
party to a combination described in the first section of this act, the full considera-
tion or sum paid by him for any goods, wares, and merchandise included in or
advanced in price by said combination.
SEC. 3. That all persons entering into any such arrangement, contract, agree-
ment, trust, or combination described in section one of this act, either on his own
account or as agent or attorney for another, or as an officer, agent, or stockholder
of any corporation, or as a trustee, committee, or in any capacity whatever, shall be
guilty of a high misdemeanor, and on conviction thereof in any district or circuit
court of the United States shall be subject to a fine of not more than ten thousand
dollars, or to imprisonment in the penitentiary for a term of not more than five
years, or to both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court. And it
shall be the duty of the district attorney of the United States of the district in which
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activities to be illegal and against public policy. The second section pro-
vided a civil remedy for any person injured by a violation of the first. Fi-
nally, the third section made a violation a "high misdemeanor" that was
punishable by a fine not to exceed $10,000 and a prison term of not more
than five years. Senator Sherman envisioned a necessary distinction be-
tween remedial civil enforcement and the use of the criminal provisions:
The first section, being a remedial statute, would be construed
liberally, with a view to promote its object. It defines a civil rem-
edy, and the courts will construe it liberally; ....
In providing a remedy the intention of the combination is im-
material. . . It is the tendency of a corporation, and not its in-
tention, that the courts can deal with.
The third section is a criminal statute, which would be con-
strued strictly and is difficult to be enforced.' 44
Senator Sherman also presumed that the traditional element of intent
would be present in criminal prosecutions. He explained that "individuals
can only be punished for criminal intentions."'
145
Senator George of Mississippi also believed that the creation of a crimi-
nal sanction would require strict construction and proof of intent. In his
opinion, the entire bill was a vague penal statute requiring careful drafting
because the courts would construe it "strictly in favor of alleged viola-
tors." 1
46
In January 1890, the Senate Committee on Finance reported a modified
version of the bill that proscribed intentional behavior only.' 47 Senator
such persons reside to institute the proper proceedings to enforce the provisions of
this act.
S. 1, 51st Cong., 1st Sess., 21 CONG. REC. 89 (1889), reprinted in 1 THE LEGISLATIVE His-
TORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS AND RELATED STATUTES 89 (E. Kintner ed. 1978)
[hereinafter cited as 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
144. 21 CONG. REC. 2546 (1890).
145. Id. at 2457.
146. Id at 1765.
147. As reported by the Senate Committee on Finance, § I of the bill provided:
That all arrangements, contracts, agreements, trusts or combinations between per-
sons or corporations made with a Yiew, or whieh tid the intention to prevent full
and free competition in the importation, transportation, or sale of articles imported
into the United States, or in the production, manufacture, or sale of articles of
domestic growth or production, or domestic raw material, that competes with any
similar article upon which a duty is levied by the United States, or intended/or and
which shall be transported from one State or Territory to anotherfor sale, and all
such arrangements, contracts, agreements, trusts, or combinations between persons
or corporations dczigncd, cr twh ..... intended to advance the cost to the con-
sumer of any such articles, a [sic] hereby declared to be against public policy, un-
lawful, and void.
S. 1, 51st Cong., 1st Sess., 21 CONG. REC. 541 (1890), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 143, at 93 (emphasis in original).
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George again argued that the proposed law was essentially a penal statute
and would have to be strictly construed. Sherman continued to stress his
opinion that the proposed law would establish dual enforcement proce-
dures: the civil provisions would be liberally construed to arrest conduct
having a tendency to prevent competition without regard to intent, while
the criminal provision would penalize only intentional offenders. He ex-
plained that "[T]he tendency is the test of legality. The intention is the test
of a crime."' 48 When Senator George continued to object to the proposed
legislation, Senator Sherman, apparently in exasperation, conceded that
George's comments about the criminal section were valid, and he agreed
to join George in striking it out. 14 9
Although statements made during congressional debates have limited
value when construing statutes, this record shows that those legislators
most prominently involved in the passage of the Sherman Act did not con-
sider it a penal statute that dispensed with the traditional protections af-
forded criminal defendants. No one disagreed about the implications of
the criminal provision. It would have to be strictly construed, and intent
would have to be proven. The Senators simply could not agree about
which portions of the proposed law would be treated as criminal. 50
Several significant changes were proposed during the congressional de-
bates, but the bill, as finally enacted, incorporated a criminal sanction. 1 ,
Neither the proposed amendments nor the final form, however, raise any
doubt that key members of the legislature believed that criminal convic-
tion would require a criminal intent.
B. Comparison with the Characteristics of Traditional Strict Liability
Offenses
Although the legislative history is apparently dispositive, congressional
purpose is also evidenced by the nature of the statute. It can be assumed
that Congress did not intend to create a strict liability offense with none of
the traditional characteristics of such offenses. These include: an essen-
148. 21 CONG. REC. 2461 (1890) (emphasis added).
149. Senator Sherman stated:
[A]ll through [Senator George's] speech he quotes the phrases of a "certain speci-
fied intent," "specific intent," "penal legislation," "reasonable doubt" "indicted
must be acquitted." . .. He no doubt is partly justified in this . . . by the third
section, which would be subject to his criticism, and which I will join him in strik-
ing out.
21 CONG. REC. 2461 (1890).
150. See I J. VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 15, § 3.0113] (1979).
151. See 21 CONG. REC. 2901, 3152-53 (1890). As finally signed into law, the Sherman
Act contained the criminal provisions. Ch. 647, §§ 1-3, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (1976)).
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tially regulatory scheme; a light penalty; and no moral stigma attaching to
conviction. As will be seen, the Sherman Act does not possess such char-
acteristics.
While the criminal sanctions of the Sherman Act are obviously intended
to control business behavior, they are not regulatory in the manner of
traditional strict liability offenses. Strict criminal liability is generally the
ultimate weapon in the arsenal of a regulatory agency that directly over-
sees the subject matter of the law.' 52 Such agencies may regulate behavior
in numerous ways, including persuasion, formal and informal administra-
tive proceedings, civil judicial actions, and ultimately criminal prosecu-
tion. The availability of a criminal sanction facilitates the agency's
regulatory activities.' 53 The Department of Justice, which enforces the
Sherman Act, is not such a regulatory agency. Thus, the Sherman Act is
not primarily a "regulatory" scheme. At a minimum, it does not fit the
usual model in which a regulatory agency utilizes a limited criminal sanc-
tion. ' 54
Moreover, the Sherman Act does not possess the characteristic light pen-
alty of strict criminal liability statutes. When first enacted, the law pro-
vided for a maximum $5,000 fine and one-year prison term, but a violation
was a misdemeanor. 55 In 1974, however, the Act was amended, and a
violation became a felony punishable by a maximum $100,000 fine ($1
million for corporations) and imprisonment for three years.' 56 The Anti-
trust Division of the Department of Justice has taken the position that per-
sons convicted of a felony should generally be sentenced to eighteen
months in prison.' 57 The Model Penal Code and many scholars argue,
however, that strict liability offenses should never result in imprison-
ment."' s The original one-year prison term, even though for a misde-
152. Paulus, supra note 93, at 459.
153. Id
154. If the criminal sanctions of the Sherman Act had been embodied in the Federal
Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1976), and entrusted to the Commission, it
could be argued that the provision was in the nature of a strict liability offense.
The Sherman Act also does not fit the mold of the "public nuisance" law. The decisions
allowing strict liability for those creating public nuisances were justified by the inability of
any single individual to seek relief. See notes 74-75 and accompanying text supra. The
Clayton Act, however, permits private civil actions in response to violations of the Sherman
Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
155. Ch. 647, §§ 1-3, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1-3 (1976)).
156. The Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, Pub. L. No. 93-528, § 3, 88 Stat. 1706
(1974) (amending 29 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (1970)).
157. Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, Department of
Justice (Feb. 24, 1977).
158. See note 97 and accompanying text supra; R. PERKINS, supra note 65, at 796; Sayre,
supra note 75, at 78.
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meanor, was sufficient to create a presumption that the element of criminal
intent was required. With the recently increased penalties, the government
should not be freed from proving the existence of moral culpability.1
5 9
The final characteristic of strict liability crimes is the societal decision
not to attach moral stigma to conviction. The conduct proscribed by the
Sherman Act, however, has been uniformly and consistently condemned
by all branches of government. In 1888, both the Democratic and Repub-
lican parties adopted planks in their party platforms condemning the
trusts. 160  In that same year, President Cleveland excoriated the "trusts,
combinations and monopolies" in his state of the union message.161 Sena-
tor Jones of Arkansas, addressing a pre-Sherman Act bill in 1889,162 used
the "sugar trust" to show his contempt for the anticompetitive activities
sought to be prohibited: "The sugar trust has its 'long, felonious fingers' at
this very moment in every man's pocket in the United States, deftly ex-
tracting with the same audacity the pennies from the pockets of the poor
and dollars from the pockets of the rich."'' 6
3
The condemnatory language has always been somewhat mitigated by a
perceived lax enforcement of the antitrust laws and the historical use of
mild penalties.'" Nevertheless, the government continues to expressly
condemn as reprehensible the conduct forbidden by the antitrust laws. In
an address to a joint session of Congress, for example, President Ford
identified antitrust violations as a serious contributing cause of inflation.165
This speech ultimately led to the 1974 amendment increasing the penalties
for violations of the Act.
The condemnation of those who unduly restrict trade has been severe as
well as persistent. The legislators who enacted the Sherman Act consid-
ered any deliberate distortion of the competitive marketplace as a threat to
159. Cf. United States v. Nu-Phonics, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 1006, 1015 (E.D. Mich. 1977)
(felony provisions may require a reconsideration of the mens rea requirement). See also
Panel Discussion - The Differences Between Trying a Criminal Antitrust Case and a Civil
Antitrust Case, 46 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J. 703, 707 (1978).
160. Antitrust Plank of the Democratic Party Platform (June 5, 1888), Antitrust Plank of
the Republican Party Platform (June 19, 1888), reprintedin 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 143, at 93.
161. Fourth Annual Message of President Grover Cleveland (Dec. 3, 1888), reprinted in 2
THE STATE OF THE UNION MESSAGES OF THE PRESIDENTS 1790-1966, 1599 (F. Israel ed.
1966).
162. S. 3445, 50th Cong., 2d Sess., 19 CONG. REC. 7512 (1889). This bill was the first
antitrust legislation introduced by Senator Sherman. See I J. VON KALINOWSKI, supra note
15, § 3.01[2], at 3-5 to 3-6 (1979).
163. 20 CONG. REC. 1457 (1889).
164. See generally Note, Sentencing Antitrust Felons, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1097
(1977).
165. President Ford's Address to a Joint Session of Congress (Oct. 8, 1974), reprinted in
30 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 43-A (1974).
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a free society. That fear continues today. Attorney General Robert Ken-
nedy, for example, saw the defendant's conduct in the celebrated electrical
equipment price-fixing cases 166 as "a serious threat to democracy."
' I61
Given the history of condemnation and the fact that violation is now a
felony, 168 conviction certainly carries the stigma of moral blameworthi-
ness.
The Sherman Act, therefore, does not exhibit any of the usual character-
istics of a strict criminal liability offense. It is not regulatory; its sanctions
are severe; and conviction can result in serious personal stigma for the
violator. Under these circumstances, Congress could not have desired to
eliminate the presumptively present element of intent. The courts, to the
extent that they have discretion, should not interpret away the intent re-
quirement.
C. Effect of the Vague Statutory Prohibitions
The vagueness of the Sherman Act must also be addressed in determin-
ing the appropriateness of strict liability. Reading intent out of a vague
criminal statute may render the law unconstitutional. 169  The Court in
Gypsum recognized that the problem of applying strict liability to Sher-
man Act offenses is aggravated because the law does not clearly define the
offense.170 Despite the current sensitivity to the statute's vagueness, when
originally faced with a challenge to the constitutionality of the Sherman
Act, the Supreme Court dismissed the challenge without serious considera-
tion. The Court's subsequent treatment of similar trade regulations, how-
ever, suggests there was more to the issue than originally perceived.
In Nash v. United States, 17 ' the defendants, who were convicted of con-
spiring to affect the price of turpentine, challenged the constitutionality of
the Sherman Act. They alleged that the law, as interpreted by the Court in
Standard Oil Co. v. United States,172 was unconstitutional. Justice
Holmes, writing for the Court, held the Act to be valid and explained that
"the law is full of instances where a man's fate depends on his estimating
rightly, that is, as a jury subsequently estimates it, some matter of de-
166. See, e.g., United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 1960 Trade Cas. 169,699 (E.D.
Pa.).
167. Television interview with Attorney General Robert Kennedy, quoted in Ball &
Friedman, supra note 100, at 198.
168. Maitland considered felony "as bad a word as you can give to man or thing." 2 F.
POLLOCK & W. MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 463 (1895), quotedin Morissette v.
United States, 342 U.S. 246, 260 (1952).
169. See notes 133-36 and accompanying text supra.
170. 438 U.S. at 438-41.
171. 229 U.S. 373 (1913).
172. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
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gree." 173
The year after Nash, however, in International Harvester Co. v. Ken-
tucky, 174 the Court invalidated a Kentucky statute proscribing combina-
tions to depreciate or increase the price of articles above or below their
"real value." The Court found the concept of "real value" to be impossi-
bly vague. It distinguished Nash as follows:
[Men must] rightly estimat[e] a matter of degree - what is an
undue restraint of trade. That deals with the actual, not with an
imaginary condition other than the facts. . . . The conditions
are as permanent as anything human, and a great body of prece-
dents on the civil side coupled with familiar practice make it
comparatively easy for common sense to keep to what is safe.
But if business is to go on, men must unite to do it and must sell
their wares. To compel them to guess on peril of indictment what
the community would have given for them if the continually
changing conditions were other than they are, to an uncertain ex-
tent; to divine prophetically what the reaction of only partially
determinate facts would be upon the imaginations and desires of
purchasers, is to exact gifts that mankind does not possess.
175
This reassuring statement was made while the antitrust world was still
reeling from the confusion of Standard Oil's "rule of reason.,'
76
The Supreme Court reached a similar result in United States v. L. Cohen
Grocery Co. 177 In Cohen Grocery, the appellee was indicated for selling
sugar at an excessive price in violation of section 4 of the Lever Act.
178
The Act proscribed the exacting of an "excessive price" for any "neces-
saries" and made it illegal to set an "unjust or unreasonable rate or
charge" when dealing in such goods. A violation could result in a fine not
to exceed $5,000 and a maximum prison term of two years. The Court had
to determine whether the statute put persons subject to these sanctions on
adequate notice of the activities that violated the Act. It concluded that
the law was clearly insufficient in this regard and explained that enforce-
ment of "the section would be the exact equivalent of an effort to carry out
a statute which in terms merely penalized and punished all acts detrimen-
tal to the public interests when unjust and unreasonable in the estimation
173. 229 U.S. at 377.
174. 234 U.S. 216 (1914).
175. Id at 223-24. The Court was concerned about the way the Kentucky statute had
been applied. Farmers' cooperatives, formed to obtain higher prices, were permissible since
they tended to stabilize prices, while manufacturing combinations were always found to
have violated the law. Id at 221.
176. See E. GELLHORN, ANTITRUST LAW AND EcONOMics 24-28 (1976).
177. 255 U.S. 81 (1921).
178. Ch. 53, § 4, 40 Stat. 276 (1917), as amended by Act of Oct. 22, 1919, ch. 80, § 2, 41
Stat. 298 (1919).
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of the court and jury. ' 179 The Court noted further that Nash and similar
cases dealt with laws that "either from the text of the statute involved or
the subjects with which they dealt, [afforded] a standard of some
sort. .... 180
Despite the Court's attempts to distinguish the Sherman Act from the
statutes involved in Cohen Grocery and International Harvester, the Act
suffers from a similar lack of standards. The legislative history shows that
the Sherman Act was deliberately intended to be indefinite with specificity
to be provided by the judiciary. Senator Sherman indicated that any line
between legal and illegal conduct would have to be provided by the
courts.' 8 ' Other members of Congress were more expressive. Congress-
man Bland, for example, introduced an amendment to specifically prohibit
monopolies in the transportation and cattle industries. Addressing the
amendment, he noted that "[tihis amendment will cover these two things,
but God knows, for no man in this House knows, what else the bill will
cover."' 82 Bland's observations were not atypical.
Judicial attempts to add certainty to the Sherman Act have been disap-
pointing because there are inherent aspects of the Act that will render it
perpetually vague. Development of case law under the Act has involved
highly factual evaluations in the light of competing economic theories.
Dean Kadish has stated that the Sherman Act is necessarily vague for
three reasons:
First, the economic policy is itself unclear. . . . Second, illegal-
ity must turn on judgments that are essentially evaluative in char-
acter, rather than on purely factual determinations. . . . Third,
the inevitable development of novel circumstances and arrange-
ments in the dynamic areas under regulation would soon make
precise formulations obsolete, even to the limited extent they
prove feasible.' 83
The uncertainty in antitrust is fostered not only by the dynamics of eco-
nomics and the market place, it is exaggerated by competing noneconomic
goals. The tension between the political and economic ends of the anti-
trust laws, for example, increases the unpredictability of the outcome in
any particular case.' 84 In this context, strict criminal liability is difficult to
justify.
179. 255 U.S. at 89.
180. Id at 92.
181. 21 CONG. REc. 2460 (1890).
182. Id at 4099. Congressman Culberson also stated that he did "not know, nor can any
man know, just what contracts will be embraced by this section of the bill until the courts
determine." Id at 4089.
183. Kadish, supra note 3, at 427-28.
184. Ball & Friedman, supra note 100, at 202.
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The purpose of this discussion is not to suggest that Nash, at this late
date, should be reversed. It is simply to show that the Sherman Act was
intentionally unspecific; that the courts, though upholding the Sherman
Act, have found very similar trade regulations to be unconstitutionally
vague; and that the statute by its nature will remain indefinite. These fac-
tors require a cautious interpretation of the Act's criminal provisions that
gives great deference to the traditional precepts of criminal law.
In sum, all of the considerations possibly justifying the elimination of
mens rea as an element of a Sherman Act violation weigh against that
result. To the extent that its purpose is discernible, Congress did not wish
to dispense with the intent requirement. Moreover, the Sherman Act does
not have the characteristics of a traditional strict liability offense. Finally,
the Act is, and will continue to be, vague. Under these circumstances, the
Court in Gypsum correctly held that intent is an element of a criminal
Sherman Act offense.
V. POST-GypSUM DEVELOPMENTS
The most encompassing issue raised by the post-Gypsum decisions fo-
cuses on the propriety of applying a "knowledge" standard in all section 1
prosecutions in which anticompetitive effects have been established. This
issue is too broad for comprehensive treatment here, but it is possible that
Gypsum's knowledge rule might not fare well with a more traditional "rule
of reason" offense. In a price verification case such as Gypsum, the actual
restraint is price-fixing which is, of course, per se illegal. The analysis con-
ducted in such cases determines whether the price exchanges had the pro-
scribed effect.' 85 It may, therefore, be appropriate to hold that those who
engage in conduct knowing that the effect is to stabilize prices have acted
with the requisite mental state to justify criminal conviction.
"Knowledge" may be a less palatable standard for "rule of reason" cases
in which the issue is the reasonableness of an acknowledged restraint and
not its existence. For example, a distributor and a manufacturer entering
into a distribution contract with an exclusive territory both know that the
agreement restrains trade, but the contract is illegal only if the restriction is
found to be unreasonable.' 86 If mere knowledge of the "restrictive" effect
on competition is sufficient to convict the contracting parties of a felony,
the distinction between civil and criminal enforcement has been lost. Gyp-
sum's factual context made a "knowledge" criterion reasonable and con-
sistent with the concepts of criminal jurisprudence being applied by the
185. See United States v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 118-20 (1975); United
States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333, 339 (1969) (Fortas, J., concurring).
186. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
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Court. Given a case in which the rule of reason is applied in its broadest
sense - "the fact finder weighs all of the circumstances of a case in decid-
ing whether a restrictive practice should be prohibited as imposing an un-
reasonable restraint on competition"'' 87 - the Court will have a difficult
time reconciling a "knowledge of the restraint" standard with the jurispru-
dential principle that only the mentally culpable may be convicted of a
crime.' 88
A second issue raised by the post-Gypsum decisions concerns the effect
that the increased penalty provisions should have on the standard of
mental culpability. There is support for the position that increasing the
gravity of the offense should result in an elevated standard of intent.' 8
9
The Court in Gypsum noted that while the penalties had been increased at
the time of the decision, the defendants had been convicted under the mis-
demeanor provisions.' 90 The courts of appeals, when confronted with this
187. Id at 49.
188. Two additional factors make the uniform application of a "knowledge" standard
questionable. First, though the appellate decisions since Gypsum have questioned even the
need to prove knowledge, the actual instructions given by the trial courts infer a "pur-
poseful" standard. For example, in United States v. Brighton Bldg. & Maintenance Co., 598
F.2d 1101 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3191 (Oct. 2, 1979), the court synopsized
the jury instructions as follows: "[I]n order to convict it must be proved that defendants
knowingly agreed or formed a combination or conspiracy for the purpose of rigging bids,
and intentionally assisted in its furtherance." Id. at 1107 (emphasis added). Similarly, in
United States v. Foley, 598 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir. 1979), petition for cert. filed, 47 U.S.L.W.
3776 (U.S. May 18, 1979) (No. 78-1737), the court paraphrased the jury instruction in this
way:
[H]e told the jury in substance that it must find beyond a reasonable doubt that
defendants must have known that their agreement, if effectuated, would have an
effect on prices; that they knowingly joined a conspiracy whose purpose was to fix
prices; and that in joining they intended to further that purpose.
Id at 1336 (emphasis added). See also United States v. Continental Group, Inc. 603 F.2d
444, 462-64 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3447 (Jan. 15, 1980) (No. 79-679).
A second factor supporting a higher standard of culpability than knowledge is the nature
of the conspiratorial crime. Conspiracies have traditionally required an elevated degree of
criminal intent. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3), Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955); Packer
supra note 80, at 145 n.141. The drafters of the Model Penal Code also considered pur-
poseful conduct to be necessary in a conspiracy case, especially when the combination has
both legal and illegal goals. A comment states: "Knowledge of that [illegal] objective and
conscious assistance may justify an inference of such purpose, but would not be indepen-
dently sufficient to establish liability." MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03, Comment (Tent. Draft
No. 10, 1960). Moreover, a Sherman Act conspiracy is somewhat unique because the con-
duct proscribed is not illegal if engaged in unilaterally. Rahl, Conspiracy and the Anti-Trust
Laws, 44 ILL. L. REV. 743, 744-45 (1950). The Model Penal Code refuses to accept that
form of conspiracy as criminal. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 10,
1960).
189. See note 97 and accompanying text supra; R. PERKINS, supra note 65, at 796; Sayre,
supra note 75, at 78.
190. 438 U.S. at 442 n.18.
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issue, determined that the new penalty provisions did not make any differ-
ence. Nevertheless, the heightened penalties are one more factor militat-
ing against strict criminal liability for Sherman Act violations.
The most significant development directly impacting upon the scope of
Gypsum, however, was the lower courts' use of strict criminal liability for
practices that are per se illegal under civil precedent. The Court in Gyp-
sum refused to find that the Sherman Act was intended to create a strict
liability offense. 9 ' The question, therefore, is whether the limitation ex-
pressly created in the subsequent decisions is an accurate interpretation of
Gypsum or general criminal law.
Gillen, Foley, and Continental Group suggested that Gypsum required
intent because the offense involved was not per se illegal;' 92 therefore, the
certainty necessary for strict liability was lacking. This reasoning ignored
the tenor and breadth of the Supreme Court's decision. The primary em-
phasis in Gypsum was on principles of criminal jurisprudence that are fun-
damentally hostile to strict criminal liability. The presumption is that mens
tea is required. 93 Having stated this general rule, the Court noted that
the traditional "inhospitable attitude to non-mens rea offenses"' 94 is rein-
forced with respect to the Sherman Act by several factors, including the
statute's indefiniteness and the possibility of overdeterrence. The Court
used the activity at issue (price verification) to illustrate the difficulty of
applying strict liability in a "rule of reason" case, but it did not indicate
that the non-per se nature of the offense was determinative.
In limiting the scope of Gypsum, the appellate courts should have appre-
ciated that the Supreme Court was not stating judicial preference but was
attempting to fathom congressional intent. The mens rea requirement can
be eliminated only if Congress intended strict liability. It is inconceivable
that the 1890 Congress foresaw the creation of the per se/rule of reason
dichotomy; it is even more inconceivable that Congress desired to make
intent an element of one type of offense and not the other.
Even if the issue was left to judicial policy making, different treatment
for per se offenses is unsound. The rationale offered by the Gillen court
was that the proscribed conduct was both clear and egregious. These justi-
fications pale upon close examination.
The Gillen approach to per se rules exaggerates the clarity they add to
the law. In McLain v. Real Estate Board of New Orleans, Inc. , for exam-
191. Id. at 443.
192. See notes 49-71 and accompanying text supra.
193. 438 U.S. at 437. See text accompanying notes 34-36 supra.
194. Id at 438.
195. 583 F.2d 1315 (5th Cir. 1978), vacated and remanded, 48 U.S.L.W. 4063 (Jan. 8,
1980) (plaintiffs had shown a sufficient jurisdictional basis to go forward with the action).
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pie, the district court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter juris-
diction because the alleged activity, conspiracy to fix commission rates for
real estate sales, did not have the requisite impact on interstate commerce.
On appeal, plaintiffs argued that jurisdiction should have been presumed
because the alleged conduct was per se illegal. The court of appeals af-
firmed, however, finding that the Supreme Court has never differentiated
betweenper se and "rule of reason" allegations to determine if jurisdiction
exists. The court also addressed the problem of relying on per se rules for
certainty in the following manner:
To say the least, it can be difficult to ascertain whether particular
allegations are classified under per se or rule of reason restraint.
See White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 83 S. Ct. 696,
9 L. Ed. 2d 738 (1963) (vertical restrictions not per se); but see
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 87 S. Ct.
1856, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1249 (1967) (vertical restraints areper se). But
see again Continental TV., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S.
36, 97 S. Ct. 2549, 53 L.Ed. 2d 568 (1977) (vertical restraints are
not per se). The often elusive boundary separating the substan-
tive analyses of per se and rule of reason restraints does not com-
mand a drastic jurisdictional differentiation. 196
The diverse positions in White Motor, Schwinn, and GTE Sylvania re-
garding vertical restraints are not extraordinary. The Fortner I' 97-Fortner
1I98 developments concerning tying arrangements also show the uncer-
tainty of deeming a particular activity a per se violation. Even the "abso-
196. Id. at 1321 n.5. See generally Redlick, The Burger Court and the Per Se Rule, 44
ALB. L. REV. 1 (1979).
197. Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969). United
States Steel provided extremely attractive credit terms (100% financing, low credit, and no
personal guarantees). Fortner sued alleging the transaction was an illegal tying arrangement
with the credit being the tying product and the homes the tied product. The trial court
granted summary judgment finding that U.S. Steel lacked sufficient power over the tying
product (credit). The Supreme Court reversed and explained that "uniquely and unusually
advantageous terms can reflect a creditor's unique economic advantages over his competi-
tors." 394 U.S. at 505. See generaly Dam, Fortner Enterprises v. United States Steel
'Weither a Borrower, Nor a Lender Be" 1969 S. CT. REV. 1.
198. United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc., 429 U.S. 610 (1977). On re-
mand of the first Fortner case, the district court found as a matter of law that U.S. Steel was
liable and submitted only the issue of damages to the jury. The court of appeals reversed
and remanded for a trial on all issues. At the second trial, U.S. Steel was again found to be
in violation, and the court of appeals affirmed. Both courts found that U.S. Steel had suffi-
cient power in the credit market. The Supreme Court reversed finding that the uniqueness
of the product is relevant only when competitors are barred in some way from offering the
distinctive product: "The unusual credit bargain offered to Fortner proves nothing more
than a willingness to provide cheap financing in order to sell expensive houses." Id at 622.
See generally Jones, The Two Faces of Fortner.- Comment On A Recent Antitrust Opinion, 78
COLUM. L. REV. 39 (1978).
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lute" rule against price-fixing is not as unqualified as Socony- Vacuum' 99
implied. The restraint in Chicago Board of Trade,2 ° ° for example, in-
volved price-fixing but was found to be reasonable. Thus, per se rules
have sometimes added more confusion than clarity to the antitrust laws.
The "bright line" between legal and illegal conduct under the Sherman
Act is simply not bright enough to justify deviation from the traditional
presumption that criminal conviction requires proof of intent.
The dominant motive for imposing strict liability when an offense is ille-
galper se is probably the egregious nature of the conduct. This is also the
most dangerous reason to relieve the prosecution of its burden. Per se
offenses, having been judicially identified as pernicious, are most likely to
involve stiff penalties and to result in social stigma. Instead of a relaxation
of procedural and substantive rights, they require strict adherence to all of
the safeguards that our criminal justice system provides to one accused of a
serious felony.2 ° 1,
A related concern is the prosecutorial difficulty engendered by requiring
proof of intent. If the government must prove knowledge, or perhaps even
purpose, a defendant may simply deny such knowledge or purpose, and
the government's task will be nearly impossible. 2  The response to this
argument is obvious: factfinders may and do infer subjective intent from
objective facts and behavior. 203 Despite their denials, men and women
have been executed because juries have found that they committed homi-
cide with "malice aforethought."
The Gillen and Brighton Building cases amply demonstrate how unnec-
essary it is for courts to eliminate the intent element to obtain convictions.
In each case, the evidence showed an overt agreement to fix prices or rig
bids. Clearly, any reasonable factfinder would have found that the de-
fendants knew and intended such obvious restraints of trade. As Professor
Handler has stated:
In the per se area - such as cases involving price-fixing, division
of markets or other similar conduct - Gypsum might appear to
place an added burden on the prosecution. This burden can,
however, readily be met, for it is inconceivable that those who
engage in conduct so pernicious that it is conclusively presumed
to be unreasonable would not know the probable effects of their
actions. Thus, inper se cases the new test may be verbally differ-
199. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., Inc. 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
200. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918). See also Appalachian
Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933).
201. See Saltzman, supra note 33, at 1638-40; Sayre, supra note 75, at 79-80.
202. See Handler, supra note 124, at 1398.
203. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 10, at 203.
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ent from the old one, but the result is the same.204
If Professor Handler is suggesting a conclusive presumption of law, the
suggestion is not consistent with Gypsum but he appears to be merely stat-
ing the obvious. It is not an onerous task to prove intent when the alleged
conduct is a per se violation.
Even if proof of subjective intent does complicate the prosecutor's task,
such difficulty is not a sound reason to eliminate intent as an element of a
serious crime. Justice Jackson addressed this serious issue in Morissette:
The Government asks us by a feat of construction radically to
change the weights and balances in the scales of justice. The
purpose and obvious effect of doing away with the requirement
of a guilty intent is to ease the prosecution's path to conviction, to
strip the defendant of such benefits as he derived at common law
from innocence of evil purpose, and to circumscribe the freedom
heretofore allowed juries.2 °5
In summary, neither the explicit nor implicit reasons that have caused
some courts to except per se violations from the scope of Gypsum justify
the exception. The per se rules are not clear enough to remedy the vague-
ness of the Sherman Act. Even when the violations are obvious, the seri-
ous consequences of conviction demand that traditional safeguards be
afforded defendants.
VI. CONCLUSION
Gypsum was a sound and reasoned statement of law. While the Court's
knowledge standard may be subject to criticism, the real wisdom of its
opinion lies in its ordering of priorities. The Court implicitly established
that when there is a conflict between antitrust precedents and significant
principles of criminal law, the latter will prevail.
Criminal law, substantive as well as procedural, defines a fundamental
aspect of the relationship between citizen and state in a democratic society.
It determines when the state may deprive an individual of freedom or
property, not for resolving a private dispute between citizens, but for pun-
ishing and ultimately shaping individual behavior. The serious implica-
tions to an accused of conviction plus the obvious danger of governmental
abuse make it essential that fundamental principles of substantive criminal
law be preserved. The requirement that only the morally culpable be pun-
ished as criminal is a persistent principle that the Court honored in Gyp-
sum.
The antitrust laws, however, are also significant to a society that orders
its economy through the discipline of a competitive market. Fortunately,
204. Handler, supra note 24, at 1399-1400.
205. 342 U.S. at 263.
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there is no real conflict between the antitrust goals and the criminal law's
principle that only the morally culpable be punished. Requiring criminal
intent does not threaten the efficacy of the Sherman Act. Violators may be
enjoined and compelled to pay civil damages regardless of their intent.
Gypsum merely holds, consistent with criminal law tradition, that the most
drastic sanction is available only for those who have a criminal intent.
The post-Gypsum cases have relied only on antitrust precedents and
have ignored the required synthesis of antitrust and criminal law. The
courts should have determined if the existence of aper se violation justifies
the elimination of the fundamental precept of criminal intent. When
viewed from the perspective of criminal jurisprudence, per se civil viola-
tions of the Sherman Act are not properly subject to strict criminal liabil-
ity.
The post-Gypsum decisions also suggest difficulties in the uniform appli-
cation of the Supreme Court's standard of culpability. This problem is a
manifestation of a persistent antitrust dilemma. Antitrust cases are ex-
traordinarily fact oriented and nuanced, and judicial attempts to make ap-
plication of the Sherman Act more certain have never succeeded.2"6 Thus,
while the courts were in error when they completely dispensed with the
intent requirement, their implicit finding that a uniform standard is inap-
propriate may be sound.
If the Supreme Court wishes to apply a single standard regardless of the
circumstances of a specific case or the type of violation, it should recon-
sider the knowledge standard adopted in Gypsum. Business activities run
the gamut from clearly illegal conduct to conduct which enjoys a strong
presumption of legality (per se legal).20 7 Strong arguments can be made
that violations in the latter category should be the basis for a criminal con-
viction only upon a showing of specific intent in its broadest sense, that is,
an intent to violate the law. Additionally, borderline restraints judged by a
classic rule of reason analysis should require a "purposeful" standard, es-
pecially if the activity has clearly legal as well as possibly illegal aspects. If
a variable standard is unacceptable, the purposeful criterion would be less
likely to do an injustice to alleged antitrust violators than the knowledge
standard applied in Gypsum.
The Supreme Court decided in Gypsum that intent is a necessary ele-
ment of a criminal Sherman Act prosecution. The decision was a signifi-
cant departure from the prior judicial approach to criminal antitrust suits
206. For a discussion of the legislative attempts to provide clarity, see E. GELLHORN,
supra note 176, at 28-30. For a discussion of the failure of the courts to provide clarity, see
text accompanying notes 195-200 supra.
207. See Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co., 243 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 822 (1957).
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because the propriety of the lower courts' rulings was judged by the stan-
dards of criminal law. Future courts should continue to develop the sub-
stantive and procedural content of the criminal applications of the
Sherman Act so that it is consistent with the principles of criminal juris-
prudence. Under these principles, the clarity and gravity of per se offenses
do not justify an exception to the general rule that intent is an essential
element of a crime.
ADDENDUM
In United States v. Society of Independent Gasoline Marketers of
America2 °" (SIGMA), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit added the weight of its authority to the position that Gypsum's in-
tent requirement applies only to non-per se offenses. A brief review of the
facts in SIGMA, and the manner in which the court distinguished Gypsum,
demonstrates how seriously the federal appellate courts are eroding the
principles announced in Gypsum.
In SIGMA, a number of "private brand" gasoline companies, several
individual officers, and a trade association (SIGMA) were convicted of
price-fixing. The evidence established that private brand companies must
compete by charging lower prices than the major producers and that com-
petition occurs at the local market level. Industry publications provided
information regarding the current and prospective national pricing activi-
ties of major oil companies. To establish competitive prices, however, a
private brand producer requires information about the local prices of both
its major and private brand competitors. The trial court found that
SIGMA was created in part to gather and disseminate such information.2 °9
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit held that intent did not have to be proven
to support the criminal convictions. It distinguished Gypsum as follows:
Gypsum involved the practice of inter-seller price verification,
a practice which is not in itself, unlawful per se.
. . . Here the indictment charged the defendants with a conspir-
acy to fix prices, and the "exchange of information" was merely
one of the activities by which the alleged agreement was effectu-
ated.210
This distinction cannot withstand scrutiny. The defendants in Gypsum
were charged with price-fixing,and price communications were identified
in the indictments as one of thirteen different types of activities used to
208. 1980-81 Trade Cas. $ 63,097 (4th Cir. Dec. 26, 1979).
209. Id. at 77,453-54.
210. Id. at 77,454.
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effectuate the conspiracy. 21' Furthermore, the accumulation and dissemi-
nation of pricing information by a trade association is, like price verifica-
tion, not per se illegal.2 12 Therefore, neither the differences between the
offenses charged in SIGMA and Gypsum, nor the methods alleged to have
facilitated the offenses justify the different legal standard adopted by the
Fourth Circuit.
The implications of SIGMA's restrictive view of Gypsum becomes read-
ily apparent when the conduct generally giving rise to criminal antitrust
prosecutions is considered. For example, in each of the fifty-four criminal
antitrust actions initiated by the Department of Justice between July 1,
1976 and September 30, 1978, defendants were charged with price-fixing,
bid-rigging, and/or territorial or customer allocations. 2 3 The possibility
of a criminal prosecution for conduct which is judged by the rule of reason
is remote at best. Thus, since criminal antitrust prosecutions are essen-
tially reserved for those engaged in activities which are per se illegal, the
SIGMA court's limitation on the legal standard regarding criminal intent
adopted in Gypsum renders the Gypsum decision an insignificant develop-
ment in criminal antitrust law.
Gypsum, however, represented a sound and novel application of an im-
portant principle of criminal law in an antitrust context.214 Yet, without
seriously addressing the principle of criminal jurisprudence motivating the
Supreme Court in Gypsum, three courts of appeals have now seriously lim-
ited its application. If the distinction stated in SIGMA can justify the dif-
ferent result, Gypsum has effectively been rendered suigeneris. An artfully
drafted indictment, alleging only per se offenses, can avoid the require-
ment that intent be proven in a criminal antitrust prosecution. The legal
precept that moral culpability is an essential element of criminality, how-
ever, is fundamental. Gypsum is too principled a decision to be avoided so
readily; certainly, it should not be discussed without a more reasoned anal-
ysis than provided by the court in SIGMA.
211. 438 U.S. at 427-28. See notes 25-26 and accompanying text supra.
212. See, e.g., Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925); note 28
supra.
213. Antitrust Division, Department of Justice, Antitrust Cases Initiated and Termi-
nated: July 1, 1976 - September 30, 1978, Rep. No. 9-4.
214. See notes 32-44 and accompanying text supra.
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